Almost nobody disputes the principle that using out-of-game information is wrong. The real disagreement is elsewhere: if that conduct happened, is a permanent ban a proportionate response?
This article does not answer “yes” or “no” for the reader. Instead, it builds a framework of six criteria commonly used to judge proportionality, then places every sourced fact within it.
The sanction imposed
Per the 23 September notice, the sanction has four parts:
- Game accounts: permanently banned.
- Competition: permanent ineligibility for PGC, PGS, PNC and every official event organized or approved by KRAFTON, in every region.
- Effective: immediately.
- Also: PUBG Vietnam Partner status revoked (from 20 September).
Section 1 of the rulebook lists a scale of “warnings, fines, disqualification, bans, forfeiture of prize money and other sanctions”. This sanction sits at the very top, and reaches beyond the event itself.
Showmatch or official tournament?
This point causes much confusion, so it is worth settling first.
- “Just a showmatch”: the format was eight Playgrounds (UGC) modes, such as racing, crossbow shooting and frying-pan melee. The field included streamers, and the aim was entertainment and interaction. KRAFTON confirmed it dropped the delay requirement to keep things live.
- “Still an official event”: Section 1 of the rulebook calls Asia Stars “an official PUBG esports tournament”. The prize pool was USD 70,000. KRAFTON also says its fairness standard applies “regardless of prize size or event type”.
The two arguments actually answer different questions:
- The type of event does not make the conduct permissible. On that point KRAFTON’s reasoning is sound.
- The type of event is relevant to how much advantage and harm resulted, which is part of proportionality.
A six-part framework
1. Severity of the conduct
According to the official finding, the conduct involved actively watching others’ streams and using the information tactically. That is not a technical slip; it goes to the heart of fairness. Severity is significant.
Set against the gravest esports offences — match-fixing, cheat software, betting on your own matches — using outside information at an entertainment event is generally treated as less severe. Match-fixing destroys the result itself, and cheat software alters in-game ability.
2. Intent
This is where the documents say least. The players say they understood the rules not to prohibit it, and some participants say they were told it was allowed. KRAFTON denies ever permitting it. Neither side has published primary material, such as Discord logs or the verbatim apologies. Intent has not been publicly established either way.
3. Advantage gained and harm caused
No publication identifies which matches or points were affected. The 20 September notice says only that “some related scores were adjusted”. Day 3 was cancelled and prize money moved to a common basis. In other words, the ranking consequences had been largely neutralised before the sanction was announced.
4. The organizer’s contribution
KRAFTON admits four failures:
- no mandatory delay;
- vague rules;
- incorrect communication before Day 2;
- inconsistent communication across languages.
In ordinary proportionality analysis, fault by the party that created the environment is a mitigating factor. It does not erase the violation, but it bears on the penalty. The 23 September notice sets KRAFTON’s fault and the players’ sanctions side by side, without explaining how the former was weighed in choosing the latter.
5. Consistency
A proportionate sanction must be consistent with similar cases. KRAFTON says allegations against others were reviewed under the same standard and warranted no sanction. It published neither criteria nor names, and the public has no PUBG precedent to compare against. Hence the renewed Gyumin question.
6. Reversibility
A time-limited ban allows a return after the penalty is served; a permanent one does not. For players at their career peak — PGC 2024 / PGS 3 and PNC 2025 champions — the gap between “time-limited” and “permanent” is roughly the gap between a penalty and the end of a career in the PUBG ecosystem.
In a table
| Criterion | Points toward severe | Points toward lighter |
|---|---|---|
| Severity | Active stream viewing, tactical use (per finding) | Not match-fixing or cheat software |
| Intent | KRAFTON: never permitted | Players: understood it was not banned |
| Advantage and harm | Other teams affected | Scores adjusted, Day 3 cancelled, prizes equalised |
| Organizer fault | — | KRAFTON admits multiple operational failures |
| Consistency | “Same standard for everyone” | Criteria and precedents unpublished |
| Professional status | Higher standard expected | — |
Reference points from wider esports
Esports has imposed indefinite bans before. The most-cited example is the 2015 iBUYPOWER match-fixing case in CS:GO, where publisher Valve banned the players involved indefinitely from Valve-sponsored events.
Esports has also used tiered approaches. In 2020, ESIC sanctioned a number of CS:GO coaches who exploited a spectator bug, with ban lengths that varied by level of involvement.
Neither example matches the circumstances of PUBG Asia Stars. They illustrate one point only: a scale exists, and a position on it needs justifying.
Conclusion
Using this framework, KRAFTON’s case is strongest on three points:
- the nature of the conduct;
- the players’ professional status;
- the “regardless of event size” principle.
The case for review is strongest on three others:
- the organizer’s admitted failures;
- the already-neutralised ranking consequences;
- the absence of a published evidence chain and precedents.
The crux is not “did the players do wrong?” It is why a lower step on the sanction scale was insufficient. Per VTC News, that is precisely what GAM × TE has asked KRAFTON to explain.